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Abstract:  This  paper  exarnines  the  effects  that  monetary  policy
actions  have  on  prices  and  output  when  the  monetary
authority  uses  open  narket  operations  in  conjunction
with  changes  in  reserve  requirements.  Both  anecdotal
and  enpirical-  evidence  suggest  that  the  Fed  uses  open
rnarket  opertions  to  accomrnodate  changes  in  the  reserve
reguirernents,  In  this  paper,  I  derive  separate
accornmodation  schemes  in  which  the  monetary  authority
stabilizes  prices  and  stabilizes  output.  The  paper,
thus,  describes  what  the  monetary  authority  can
accornplish  by  coordinating  their  poJ-icy  actions.
Furthermore,  the  description  may  be  helpful  in  terms  of
judging  past  monetary  policy  behavior.
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and1.  Introduction
Monetary  policy  has  three  tools--open  market  operations,
discount  window  borrowing,  and  changes  in  reserve  requirernents--
through  which  it  can  change  the  quantity  of  nonetary  base.  In
this  paper,  I  analyze  the  effects  associateil  with  using  two  of
these  tools  simultaneouslv. In  particuJ-ar,  I  am interested  in
studying  hohr changes  i.n  reserve  requirements  interact  with  open
rnarket  operations.
Does  the  Federal  Reserve  routinely  coordinate  changes  in
reserve  requirernents  with  open  market  operations.  The  answer  j-s
apparently  yes.!  Muelendyke  (1"992, p,3)  asserts  that  the  Federal
Reserve  uses  open  market  sales,  for  exarnple,  to  accommodate  the
decrease  in  the  demand for  (required)  reserves  associated  with
lower  reserve  requirenents.  Haslag  and  Hein  (1993)  find  that  a
l-percentage-point  increase  in  monetary  base  growth  contributed
by  lowering  reserve  requirements  is  systematically  matched  by  a
decrease  of  fess  than  l--percentage-point  in  the  contribution  by
high-powered  money  to  monetary  base  growth.  Diryer  and  saving
1  Another  issue  is  whether  changes  j-n  reserve  requirement
ratios  occur  frequently  enough  to  examine  the  effcts  of
coordinated  policy.  Haslag  and  Hein  (1993)  find  that  reserve
requirenent  ratios  were  implemented  in  48  of  the  372  months
between  January  1960  and  December  1990.  The  frequency  with  which
the  Federal  Reserve  changes  reserve  requirements  over  this  tine
period,  therefore,  is  approxirnately  once  every  eight  months.  The
1960-1990  period  includes  the  Monetary  control  Act  of  1980 hrhich
specified  a  phasing-in  of  reserve  requirment  chanqes  for  member
and  non-member  depository  institutions.  while  this  certainly
inflated  the  frequency  of  changes  in  reserve  requ j-rements,  it
does  not  diminish  the  need  to  study  the  effects  of  coordinated
nonetary  poJ.icy  actions  since  the  Fed  routinely  acconmodated  such
mandated  reserve  requirenent  changfes  during  the  1980s,(L986)  provide  some ttreoretical  rnotivation  for  coordinating
changes  in  reserve  requirements  and  open  market  operations.  In
their  nodel,  the  nonetary  authority  has  a  seignorage  revenue
target.  Holding  the  seignorate  revenue  target  constant,  if  the
monetary  authority  lor,irers  reserve  requirements  then  the  growth
rate  of  high-powered  money  declines.
The  main  contribution  of  this  paper  is  an  investigation  into
the  effects  that  coordinated  monetary  policy  actions  have  with
respect  to  prices  and  output.  The  proportion  to  which  the
monetary  authority  accomrnodates  the  percentage  change  j-n  reserve
requirernents  with  a  percentage  change  in  high-powered  money  is
defined  as  an  accommodation  scheme.  The  question  addressed  here
is  whether  accornrnodati-on  schemes  exist  such  that  coordinated
monetary  policy  actions  yield  either  zero  change  in  the  price
level-  or  zero  change  in  output.  (Here,  zero  change  or
stabilization  refers  to  a  case  in  which  policy  actions  do  not
result  in  changes  relative  to  the  existing  steady-state.  )  The
findings  reported  here  are  useful  insofar  as  one  cares  about  the
inplicatj-ons  of  such  accomrnodatj-on  schenes,  which  are  part  of  the
Fedts  tool  kit.  As  such,  the  results  provide  sone  basis  for
interpreting  the  Fed's  historical  behavior,
The  nain  findings  presented  in  this  paper  are  essential-Iy
proofs  that  two  accornrnodations  scheme  exist,  one  in  which  the
price  levef  is  stabilized  and  one  in  which  output  is  stabiLized.
I  show  that  the  price  1eve1  is  stabilized  when  the  monetary
authority  fully  accornrnodates  changes  in  reserve  requirements.Output  stabilization  is  achieved  r,rith  a  partial  acconmodation  In
addition,  the  implications  the  rnoney rnultiplier  and  capitaL  are
also  derived,  Thus,  the  findings  irnply  that  coordinating
monetary  policy  actions  can  stabilj-ze  ej-ther  prices  or  output,
but  not  both  simuttaneously.
The  model  econony  specified  here  is  a  sinple  overlapping
qenerations  rnodel.  Agents  are  forced  to  hold  part  of  thej-r
deposits  in  the  form  of  fiat  rnoney balances--the  reserve
requirenent,  This  assurnption  resoLves  the  problem  present  when
other  stores  of  value,  such  as  government  bonds,  offer  higher
rates  of  return.
Two  features  of  the  overlapping  model- drive  the  results  in
this  paper,  The  fact  that  the  monetary  authority  can  stabilize
prices  does  not  depend  on  the  model  specification.  However,  the
type  of  the  accomrnodation  scheme--perfectLy  accommodating  changes
in  reserve  requirernents--is  a  property  of  the  nodel.
Specifically,  the  overlapping-generat  j-ons model  yields  a  money
demand  specification  that  is  linear  j-n  the  reserve  requirement
ratio.  In  a  more  general  money  demand  function,  matchinq  the
change  in  reserve  requirement  percentage-point-for-percentage-
point  with  changes  in  high-powered  money  would  not  result  in  zer
change  in  the  price  leve1  .  The  hray to  interpret  my  results  is  as
a  specj-al  case,  not  as  a  necessary  condition  for  stabi-lizing
prices,
The  second  assumption  is  neccessary  in  this  model  for  the
existence  of  an  accommodation  scheme to  stabilize  output.  I
3assume  that  nominal  governrnent  bonds  are  net  wealth,  I  further
assume  that  the  monetary  authority  determines  the  governmentrs
debt  burden  through  open  rnarket  operations.  In  other  words,  open
market  purchases  are  equivalent  to  retiring  an  equal  amount  of
the  governmerit'r  s  clebt  burden.  The  dffects  of  coordinated
monetary  policy  actions,  in  tenns  of  stabilizing  output,  depends
crucially  on  open  market  operations  affecting  the  size  of  agentts
net  wealth  in  this  non-Ricardian  set-up.
The  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  briefly
reviews  the  l-iterature  on  the  effects  of  changes  in  reserve
requirernents  considered  in  isol-ation.  Section  3  describes  the
modeL.  The  accornmodation  schemes  necessary  to  achieve  price
stabilizatj-on  and  output  stabilization  are  derived  in  Section  4.
The  results  are  briefly  sunmarized  in  Sectj-on  5.
2.  Literature  Review
Studies  looking  at  the  effects  of  reserve  requirements  have
generally  focused  on  two  issues,  One strand  of  literature  has
developed  focusing  on  the  effects  that  reserve  requirements  have
on  economic  activity.  The  other  strand  has  exanined  the  welfare
implications  of  reserve  requirernents.
Bal-tensperger  (1982)  and  Horrigan  (1988)  exernplify  the
strand  in  which  reserve  requirements  affect  econonic  activity.
In  both  papers,  the  focus  is  on  whether  the  presence  of  reserve
requirernents  stabilizes  the  denand  for  money  and  econornic
activity.  fn  this  literature,  conparisons  are  typically  madebetween  0  percent  and  L00  percent  reserve  requirement  cases.  For
exanple,  Baltensperger  finds  that  a  100  percent  reserve
requirement  does  not  necessarily  resu]t  in  lowerinq  the  variance
of  output  compared  $rith  a  o  percent  reserve  requirement.
Horrigan  denonstrates  that  reserve  requirernents  can  reduce  output
variability.  Horrigan  also  finds  that  the  reserve  requirement  is
irrel-evant  in  an  interest-rate  targetlng  regirne.
The  second  strand  in  the  literature  focuses  on  the  welfare
implications  of  reserve  requirements.  Freeman  (1987)  shows  that
when  reserve  requirements  are  conbined  hrith  inflation,  welfare  is
Iower.  The  optinal  setup  is  one  in  r^rhich the  reserve  requirement
rati-o  is  zero  and  infLation  is  infinite,  Russell  and  Mourmouras
and  Russell  (l-992)  generalize  Freemanrs  rnotivation  for  holding
fiat  noney.  They  find  that  the  welfare  implications  are
ambiguous  in  a  more  genera]  structure.  Hence,  a  non-uero  reserve
requirernents  may be  optirnal.  Cothren  and  Waud (1991)  argue  that
a  positive  reserve  requirernent  can  yield  higher  utility  than  an
economy  with  free  banking.  In  Cothren  and  Waudts  nodel,  reserve
requirernents  raise  are  (weakly)  Pareto  dominant  to  a  case  without
reserve  requirernent  because  the  reserve  requj-rernent  lohrers  search
costs  .
A  paper  more  cfosely  related  to  this  one  is  Romer  (1985),  in
which  the  effects  of  that  changes  in  reserve  requirements  are
exarnined;  specifically  the  effects  on  the  price  level,  interest
rates,  and  inside  money.  Romer  finds  that  changes  in  reserve
requirements  do  not  change  the  price  l-evel.  Hence.  the  Fed  doesnot  need  to  acconnodate  changes  in  reserve  requirements  in  order
to  stabiLize  prices.  In  addition,  Romer finds  that  deposits
(inside  rnoney)  is  positivel-y  reLated  to  changes  in  reserve
requirements  rthen  the  Fed  does  use  open  market  operations  in
conjunction  vith  changes  in  reserve  requirements.
This  paper  devj-ates  fron  the  the  first  two  strands  of
literature  in  the  sense  that  (i)  I  do  not  examine  the  weLfare
inplications  of  the  reserve  requirement  and  (ii)  I  exanine
changes  in  reserve  requirernents,  but  do  not  compare  a  case  in
which  requirements  are  present  to  a  case  in  reserve  reguirernents
are  present.  Instead.  the  paper  is  nore  closely  associated  with
Romerrs  work,  extendinq  the  analysis  to  consider  joint  nonetary
policy  actions  and  to  exarnine  the  output  implications  of  such
policy  actions.
3,  The Model
The  nodel  adapts  Cass  and  Yaarirs  (1966)  version  of  the
overlapping-generations  rnodel  of  Samuelson  (1958).  Agents  carry
over  noney  balances,  capital,  and  government  bonds  from  the  first
period  to  the  next  in  order  to  consume  in  the  second  period.
Returns  offered  by  both  bonds  and  capital  (vrhich,  for  sirnplicity,
are  perfect  substitutes)  strj-ctly  dorninate  money balances.  The
rnodel  rnodif ies  Freenan  (1987)  in  that  agents  are  required  to  hold
a  fraction  of  their  deposits  as  noney  balances,  representj-ng  a
rrreserve  requirement.  rl
3.1  Agentr s  CharacteristicsAgents  live  two  periods.  In  each  period  t  >  1,  Nt agents
are  born  (the  young  generation),  coexistj-ng  viith  those  born  j.n
the  previous  period  (the  o1d  generation).  The  population  grows
at  the  (positj-ve)  constant  gross  rate  n,  so  that  Nt =  nNt_r.  At
tine  t  =  1,  there  are  N0 members of  the  old  generation.
Each  young  aqent  maxirnizes  the  utility  function  represented
as  U(cl,  cr) ,  where  cr  denotes  consunption  in  the  i  th  period  of
the  agentrs  1ife.  We assume that  the  utility  function  is  twice-
continuously  differentiable,  strictly  concave,  and  strictly
increasinq  in  both  c,  and  cr.  (For  those  old  agents  at  tirne  t  =
1,  utility  is  an  increasing  function  of  consurnption.  )  In
addition,  we assume that  U1/U2  *  O(€)  as  crfc,  r  o(0),  hrhere Ur is
the  rnarginal  utility  with  respect  to  the  consurnption  in  the  i  th
period  of  the  agent's  life.
3.2  ProdluctioD
Each  agent  is  endowed  with  one  unit  of  ]abor  $rhen young  and
nothing  when  ol-d.  People  in  the  young  generation  supply  labor
inelastically.  Capital  is  created  from  the  unused  consurnption
good  at  a  one-for-one  rate,  cornbined  with  labor  in  the  next
period  to  produce  aggregate  output,  denoted  y.  However,  I  assume
that  capital  cannot  be  created  fron  l-ess  than  x  units  of  the
consumption  good  where  K  >  y.  Each  unit  of  capital  created  in
period  t  will  produce  x  units  of  the  consumption  good  in  periodt+1.2  I  assume  that  x  >  n.  The  capital-  stock  j-s  conpletely
depreciated  hrhen the  production  process  is  finished.
3.3  Financial  Environment
Wj-th  r  >  y,  agents  must  pool  their  savings  in  order  to
obtain  the  higher  return  offered  by  capital.  Sirnilarly,
government  bonds  are  issued  in  units  too  large  for  isolated
individuals  to  purchase.  Agents,  however,  can  form
rrintermediariesrt  that  pool  enough  savings  to  overcome  the  rninimun
size  restrictj.on  on  capital  and  bonds.  We refer  to  the  pooled
savings  as  deposits,  denoted  D.  Financial  intermediation  is
assuned  to  be  costless  and  cornpetitively  provided.  A  fraction  of
these  interrnediated  deposits  are  held  in  the  form  of  high-powered
money,  which  can  be  thought  of  as  non-interest  bearing  currency.3
The  old  agents  in  period  t  =  1  are  endowed  with  M0 units  of
fiat  rnoney,  consisting  of  unbacked,  intrinsically  useless  pieces
of  paper  that  are  costlessly  produced,  Money  supply  increases
2 Rebelo  (1991-) exanines  the  long-run  effects  of  fiscaf
policy,  using  a  linear  production  technology  sirnilar  that  used  in
this  paper.  Growth  is  endogenous  in  the  sense  that  exoqenous
shocks  to  productivity  or  population  growth  are  not  reguired  for
the  path  of  output  growth  to  change.  Note  also  that  the
production  technology  follows  Diarnond  (1965)  in  the  sense  that
capital  goods  are  not  productive  until-  the  follohring  period,
Thus,  rnthatever  happens  to  the  capital  stock  in  period  t  shows  up
as  an  output  response  in  period  t+1-.  Hence,  one  should  interpret
x  as  the  gross  real  return  on  capital.
3  Becuase  of  the  rate  of  return  dominance,  currency
holdings  in  this  model- are  nore  cl-osely  associated  with  vault
cash.  A  more  general  framework  hrould  generate  a  need  for
currency  and  deposits  to  be  hel-d  sinuLtaenousfy.  The  nainf
feature  of  this  general  framework  would  be  that  money  demand  is
not  a  linear  function  of  reserve  requirenents.according  to  the  following  rule:  ltt  =  €ol4_r, for  each  t  >  1.
3.,1  covernmeDt
Expansion  of  the  fiat  money  supply  is  used  to  purchase  g
units  of  the  consumption  good  per  young  person  by  the  government.
The  goods  col-Iected  by  the  governrnent  throuEh  the  expansion  of
the  rnoney supply  do  not  affect  the  utility  of  individual  agents.
The  government  collects  a  lump-sum  tax  (or  equivalently,  a  labor
income  tax)  of  r  units  of  the  consumption  good  fron  each  young
person.  covernnent  expenditures  can  also  be  financed  via  nominaL
denorninated  debt  lrorth  B  units  of  fiat  money.  covernment
expenditures  are  on  the  consumption  good  and  j-nterest  payments  to
hoLders  of  government  debt,  Formal-l-y,  the  governmentts  budget
constrai-nt  is  represented  as  foLLows:
(1) Ntptgt  +  xBr-l  =  N.Frz.  +  Bt  +  (M.  -  M._r)
where  p  is  the  price  of  goods  in  units  of  fiat  money.
I  further  assume  that  when  the  monetary  authority  conducts
open  market  operations,  the  government  debt  burden  to  the  members
of  the  young  generations  changes.  In  sfrort,  open  market  sales
(purchases)  are  associated  with  increases  (decreases)  in  Bt.
This  assumption  is  motivated  by  the  fact  that  the  Federal  Reserve
returns  most  of  its  profits  to  the  Treasury.  Whatever  interest
or  capital  gains  earned  by  the  Fed  are  routinely  given  back  to
the  Treasury.  This  characteri  zation  suggests  that  Fed  ownership
of  Treasury  debt  is  equivalent  to  retiring  government  debtburdens,
3.5  Statioaary  Equilibria
Throughout  the  paper  we  will  focus  our  attention  on
equilibria  in  which  the  econornyt s  total-  desired  capital  stock
exceeds  the  rnininurn size  restriction;  that  is,  k.  )  K.o  The
stationary  equilibriurn  in  this  econony  is  easy  to  characterize.
Let  r  denote  the  gross  rate  of  return  on  savings  and  s  is  the
savings  of  an  agent.  Then  an  agent  chooses  s  to  naximize  U(cr,
cr)  subject  to  y  =  c1 +  s  and  c.  =  r"s.  Saving,  the  difference
between  incone  and  consumption  when  young,  is  formally  described
(2) sr  =  k.+br+yD!,
where  Y  is  the  reserve  requirenent  ratio  and  D denotes  the  real
stock  of  interrnediated  deposits.  This  specification  differs
slightly  from  Freemanrs  in  that  he  applied  reserve  requirements
to  total  savings,  Here,  reserve  requirenent  are  applied  only
aqainst  deposits.  This  change  prinarily  affects  the  algebra,  not
Freemani s  conclusions.
We define  steady-state  level  of  reaL  noney  holdings  as  h.
The  market-clearing  conditions  for  money  balances  and  governnent
o  Charnp  and  Freeman  (1990)  derive  a  closed-form  dynamic
representatj.on  for  the  capital  stock.  In  that  paper,  the  authors
assume that  utility  is  time  separable  and  the  second-period
utility  exhibits  risk-neutral  ity.  In  addition,  agents  are
assumed to  hold  a  fixed  real  quantity  of  fiat  money,  h/hereas  here
fiat  noney  is  held  as  a  fraction  of  interrnediated  deposits.
10bonds  are  represented  as
M. =  N.p.h
and  B.  =  N.p.b..
one  can  revrrite  the  market-clearing  condition  for  money,  sotving
for  the  price  1evelr  pt  =  Mt/Nth.  Thus,  the  qross  real-  rate  of
return  on  fiat  money  equals
tJ, P./P.*r  :  n/80.
By  assurnption,  n/e0  <  n  <  x.  Because  the  rate  of  return  on  bonds
and  capital  dominate  the  rate  of  return  on  rnoney,  agents  hold
money  balances  up  to  the  point  where  they  are  required.
By  definition,  h  =  TD.  we define  J  as  tne  steady-state
level-  of  real  intermediated  deposits.  Clearly,  a  steady  state
quantity  of  intermediated  deposits  irnplies  as  steady-state  level
of  savj,ngs,  denoted  s.  Frorn equation  (2),  we know  that
(4) k.  =  s/(1+y)  -  bt.
In  addition,  the  money-growth  rule  and  the  steady-state  level  of
real  money  balances  per  young  person  can  be  substituted  into  the
(aggreqate)  government  budget  constraint.  After  dividing
equation  (1)  through  by  N.p.,  one  gets
bt  =  9.  *  x/eo  br-1 -  r.  -  yD(1-1leo), (3J
11Note  that  the  Last  term  on  the  right-hand-side  in  expression  (5)
is  the  real  seignorage  revenue  per  young  person  earned  by  the
government.
Substituting  equation  (5)  into  equation  (4)  yields  the
following  expression  for  capital-
(6)  k.  =  s/(1+y)  -  [gt  + x/eo b.-r -  r.  -  1J1r-r7eoy1.
Equation  (6)  indicates  that  both  the  supply  of  money and  reserve
requirements  affect  the  capital  stock  through  their  effects  on
real  seignorage  revenue  per  young  person  raised  by  the
government.  Each  action  also  affects  capital  through  separate
channels:  changes  in  the  money  stock  affect  the  real  interest
paynents  on  government  bonds,  while  reserve  requirements  have  a
portfolio  allocation  effect  which  crowds  out  other  types  of
savincr.
4.  Coordinated  Monetary  Po1icv
In  this  section,  I  focus  on  the  effects  that  changes  in
reserve  requirernents  and  open  market  operations  have  on  the
steady-state  equilibriurn.  Becuase  we focus  on  steady-state
cornparisons,  the  anaLysis  is  sirnplfied  to  consider  policy  actions
that  are  one-tirne,  unantj.cipated  changes,
Here,  the  term  rrperfectrr  accommodation  describes  the  case  in
ethich  the  monetary  authority  uses  open  market  operations  to  fully
match  the  quantity  of  fiat  money  freed  (absorbed)  by  lowering
L2(raising)  reserve  requirernent  ratios;  formally,  this  case  is
defined  as dT/Y = dM/M.  The nain  findings  in  the  paper  are
presented  in  four  propositions--tlro  apply  to  the  full
accommodati"on scherne and two  to  a  partial  accommodation.
{.1  The  full-acconmodlation  case
Ploposition  1:  Changes  in  reserve  requLrements  that  are
Perfectly  accoEmodated  by  open  market  operations  have  no  effect
on  either  the  price  level  or  the  quantity  of  intermediatedl
deposits.
Proof:  The  equilibrium  condition  for  the  money  market  is
sufficient  to  demonstrate  that  prices  do  not  change  in  response
to  such  coordinated  rnonetary  policy  actions.  Substituting  h:yD
into  the  rnoney market  equilibriurn  condition,  the  elasticity  of
prices  vith  respect  to  y  and  M,  respectively,  is  represented  by
the  foll-owing  pair  of  equations  (time  subscripts  are  onitted  for
convenience)  :
(7) dp/dy(y/p)  = -tM(NyD)-'l (ND)  (r/p)  = -r
dp/dM(y/M) =  tNpyDl-1  (M/p)  = 1. (8)
Together,  equations  (7)  and  (8)  indicate  that  rrith  dyly  :  dM/M,
the  price  level  is  unchanged.  Thus,  coordinating  the  same
percentage-change  in  reserve  requirernents  and  fiat  money  results
13in  no  change  in  the  price  level.s
Recal1  that  the  steady-state  quantity  of  interrnediated
deposits  (or  inside  noney)  i=  J  =  u.71.  Cl-early,  hrith  perfectl-y
offsetting  changes  in  reserve  requirernents  and  fiat  rnoney (in
percentage-change  terms),  the  ratio  of  fiat  noney  to  reserve
requirenents  is  unaffected.  Hence,  the  steady-state  quantity  of
internediated  deposits  is  not  affected  by  perfectly  coordinated
monetary  actions.I
The  intuition  in  proposition  1is  fairly  stra  ightforhrard.
Changes  in  the  reserve  requirernent  ratj.o  affect  the  denand  for
money.  Thus,  an  decreased  dernand for  fiat  money associated  with
lower  reserve  requirements,  for  exampJ-e,  can  be  exactly  rnatched
by  a  decrease  in  the  supply  of  fiat  rnoney without  affecting  the
price  level.  The  quantity  of  inside  money is  not  affected
because  egual-sized  changes  in  reserve  requirements  and  fiat
rnoney do  not  neceessitate  any  crowding  out  of  deposits.
The  nain  irnplication  of  proposition  1is  that  the  monetary
authority  can  perfectly  accommodate  changes  in  reserve
requirements  with  changes  in  fiat  money  to  stabilize  movernents  in
prlces  and  the  broader  monetary  aggregates.  The  effect  of
perfectly  coordinated  nonetary  policy  action  on  output  is
described  in  the  following  proposition.
t  Note  that  Dwyer  and  Saving  (1986)  find  that  seignorage
revenue  is  similarly  unchanged  in  response  to  an  the  percentage-
change  in  reserve  requirements  being  accommodated  by  an  equal-
sized  percentage  change  in  governnent  money.
14.It  is  also  cl-ear  frorn  equations  (7)  and  (8)  that  the  linear
demand  for  fiat  rnoney drives  the  resuLt  that  the  perfect
accommodation  schene  has  no  effect  on  the  price  1evel.5  In  this
specification,  setting  the  percentage-change  in  reserve
requirements  equal-  to  the  percentage-change  in  fiat  noney  supply
will  not  affect  prices,  A  nore  general  money demand
specification  does  not  overturn  the  results  in  the  sense  that
price  stabilization  can  still  be  achieved  througrh  coordinated
nonetary  policy  actions.  However,  the  acconmodation  scheme
necessary  to  stabilize  prices  \,ri]l,  in  general,  not  be  of  the
tYpe  in  $rhich  dT/y  =  dM/M.
Proposition  2:  ff  the  nonetary  authority  lowers  reserve
reguirenents  that  are  perfectly  offset  by  open  market  sales,  then
the  capltal  stock  and  output  decline.
Proof:  Proposition  1  indicates  that  the  real-  quantity  of
interrnediated  deposits  are  unaffected  by  perfectly  coordinated
monetary  policy  actions,  With  lower  reserve  requirenent  ratios,
fiat  rnoney  is  reduced  by  open  rnarket  sa1es,  rnore  specifically,
-dM  =  dB,  Since  sel-Ii-ng  debt  raises  the  government  I s  debt  and
with  the  quantity  of  intermediated  deposits  fixed,  the  increase
5  This  is  r^rhere this  rnodel  reaI1y  dif  feres  from  Ro:ner  r  s.
In  Romer,  the  steady-state  equilibriurn  for  inffation  is  not  a
function  of  reserve  requirernents.  In  the  case  where  the  steady-
state  inflation  rate  is  zero,  the  rnonetary  authority  does  not
need  to  accommodate  changes  in  reserve  requirernents  t ith  open
market  operations  in  order  to  stabil-ize  the  inflation  rate.  In
this  model,  the  reserve  requirement  does  affect  the  steady-state
inf  ]ation  rate,
_15in  governrnent  bonds  irnplies  that  the  capitaf  stock  fa1ls.
Consequently,  the  decline  in  capital  results  in  less  output  next
period.  I
with  prices  constant.  the  fuII  accornrnoflation  scheme  is
similar  to  Poolers  (1970)  interest-rate  peg,  The  question,
therefore,  is  whether  the  coordinated  monetary  policy  actions
keep  the  interest  rate  constant.  Note  that  there  are  several
interest  rates  present  in  this  setup.  Hovrever,  one  can  be
dj-srnissed  as  trivial-  for  a  policy  pursuit.  Specifically,  the
marginal  product  of  capital,  is  not  very  interesting  because  I
assune  a  ]inear  production  technoLogy.  With  capj-ta1  and  bonds  as
perfect  substitutes,  the  return  on  government  bonds  is  pegged
independent  of  monetary  policy.  Of  course,  under  a  more  general
production  technology  (decl-ining  marqinal  products),  the  effect
of  the  fuII-accommodation  scheme  on  capital  would  be  to  drive
down  its  real  return.  Since  prices  are  fixed  by  fully
accommodati-ng  changes  in  reserve  requirernents,  such  policy
coordination  is,  in  general-,  not  consistent  with  pegging  interest
rates.
Afternativety,  the  monetary  authority  may  target  the  agTent's
rate  of  return,  represented  as:
(e) r'=1(n/@q)+(1-y)x.
fuIl-accornmodation  scenario,  a Ina
LO
one-time,  permanent  decreasein  reserve  requirements,  for  example,  inplies  a,  one-time,
permanent  decrease  in  the  stock  of  fiat  money.  or,  the  permanent
decrease  in  reserve  requirernents  has  an  effect  on  the  rate  of
change  in  fiat  money,  resulting  in  er  < eo.  Hence,  coordinated
monetary  policy  actions  will  resuLt  in  a  change  in  r*.  To  show
this  point,  differentiate  equation  (9)  with  respect  to  e  and  y
(eval-uated  at  €=€o),  which  yields
(n/eo -  x)dT  -  ln(eo)-2 de.
With  n/Ao  <  x  and  dy  <  dO <  0,  this  expression  is  negative.
Thus,  lorrering  reserve  requirements,  for  example,  wil-l-  result  in
a  higher  return  on  agentrs  portfolios.
4.2  The  partial-acconmodation  case
Proposition  3:  There  exists  a  unique  coordlinatedl  action  in  rthich
the  nonetary  authority  partially  offsetE  lorrer  reserve
reguirementE  with  open  market  sales  such  that  tbe  prLce  level
rises  antl  capital  aDd  next-peEiod  output  are  unchanged.
Proof:  The  existence  of  a  partial  accommodation  scheme  is
demonstrated  by  first  exarnining  the  effect  of  lowering  reserve
requirements  without  any  offsetting  open  market  operatj-ons.  In
this  case,  differentiating  equation  (6)  with  respect  to  y  yields
the  followinq:
I7(10) dk/d1  =  -s/(L+'t'''+  D(1-1180).
wj-th  e0 >  1  (the  rrinitial-rr  gross  rate  of  noney  qrowth)  ,  the  two
terms  in  equation  (10)  opposite  in  sign.  A  decrease  in  reserve
requirements,  holding  everything  else  constant,  increases  the
proportion  of  the  portfolio  that  could  be  used  to  purchase
capital,  This  'rcrowding-ou1',  effect  is  enbodied  in  the  first
term.  The  second  term  indicates  that  a  decrease  in  reserve
requirements  is  associated  with  an  decrease  in  real  seignoraqe
revenue,  which  decreases  capital.  I  assune  that  the  crowding-out
effect  dominates  the  seignorage-revenue  effect  so  that  lowering
reserve  requi.rernents  is  associated  with  an  increase  in  capital
stock.
changes  in  the  fiat  noney  stock  are  positively  related  to
changes  j-n  the  capital  stock.  A  decrease  in  fiat  money  reduces
real  seignorage  revenue.  resuftinq  in  a  lower  capital  stock.
From  proposition  2,  qre know  l-ower  reserve  requirements  that  are
perfectly  accommodated  are  associated  with  a  decrease  in  capital;
that  is,  dk/dy  <  0.  with  the  crowding-out  effect  doninating,
lowering  reserve  requirements  with  zero  accommodatinq  results
greater  capital;  that  is,  dk/dy  >  0. What  is  yet  to  be  proved
1n
is
that  partially  accommodating  .Iower  reserve  requirernents  with  a
decrease  in  the  fiat  rnoney  stock  (relative  to  its  normal  rate  of
growth)  wiII  yield  a  zero  change  in  output.
To  compl-ete  the  proof,  it  is  necessary  to  shol't  that  dk/dY  is
1,8a  continuous,  decreasing  function  of  the  percentage-change  in  the
fiat  noney  stock  accornmodating  changes  in  reserve  requirements.
I  begin  by  defining  a  variable  c  as  the  proportion  of  the
percentage-change  in  reserve  requirements  that  j-s  accornrnodated  by
the  monetary  authority,  For  exampLe,  when  dT/l  =  dM/M  (vrhere
dM/M  represents  deviations  from  the  I'normalI  growth  rate  of  fiat
noney)  the  nonetary  authority  perfectly  acconmodates  changes  in
reserve  requirements  and  a  =  1,  Fornal"ly,  let  o  e  [0,1],  thereby
elininating  cases  j.n  which  the  monetary  authority  so  that  the
nonetary  authority  excessively  accommodates  (a  >  1)  or  enhances
(a  <  0).  Furthermore,  l-et  Or  denote  the  growth  rate  of  fiat
noney  such  that  o  =  (o'-00)  /d.t /.t.  Frorn this  representation,  o  is
a  continuous,  increasing  function  of  changes  in  the  stock  of  fiat
money balances  relative  to  normal  path.  From equation  (10),
dk/d1  is  negatively  related  to  changes  in  the  growth  rate  of  fiat
money.  Since  the  agentrs  utility  function  is  twice-continuously
differentiable,  dk/d1  is  continuous.  Thus,  dk/d1  is  a
continuous,  decreasing  function  in  c.I
The  nain  inplication  from  proposition  3  is  that  the  rnonetary
authority  can  stabil-ize  output  and  capital  by  only  partially
accommodating  chanqes  in  reserve  requirements  with  open  market
operations,  The  next  proposition  identifies  the  effect  that  a
partial  accornmodation  scheme  has  on  the  price  level  and
internediated  deposits.
19PropositioD  {:  Suppos€ the  nonetary  authority  partially
acconnodateE  a  reduction  reserve  requirements,  denotedl  c',  such
that  the  capital  stock  and  output  renain  conEtant.  The c'
strategf  is  associatedl  with  higher  priceE  anal arr increase  in
intermediated  deposits.
Proof:  By definition,  with  0 < c" < 1,  the  percentage  change in
reserve  requirenents  is  greater  than  the  percentage  change  j.n
fiat  money.  With  l-ohrer reserve  requirements,  there  is  an  excess
suppl-y  of  fiat  noney  resulting  in  a higher  price  J-evel.
Sirnilarly,  the  quantity  of  internediated  deposits  rise  as  the
ratio  of  fiat  monev to  reserve  requirements  increases.l
Thus,  Propositions  1  and  2  indicate  that  the  nonetary
authority  can  stabiLize  the  price  level  and  j-nside  rnoney  supply
by  coordinating  reserve  requj-rement  changes  with  open  narket
operations  such  that  the  percentage  change  in  the  respective
tools  is  identical.  A  perfect  accommodation  scheme,  however,
results  in  changes  in  capital  and  output.  The  resuLts  also  show
that  the  monetary  authority  can  conduct  a  partiaf  accomrnodation
that  stabilized  capital  and  output,  but  at  the  cost  of  price
level  and  inside  money volatility.
Note  that  a  rol-e  for  output  stabilization  depends  crucially
on  the  assurnption  that  government  bonds  are  net  private  wealth.
One reason  is  because  seignorage  can  reduce  the  real  burden  of
the  national  debt.  ff  government  bonds  were  indexed,  then
agentrs  net  weaLth  wiII  not  be  transferred  to  the  governrnent  via
20real  devaluations.T  Consider  a  Ricardian  setting.  If  government
bonds  are  not  net  private  wealth,  seignorage  revenue  would  not
affect  the  value  of  the  agentrs  governrnent  bond  holdings.
Accordingrly,  open  market  sales  used  to  decrease  the  supply  of
fiat  money  wi.ll  perfectly  accommodate  lower  reserve  requirements,
but  htill  not  crowd  out  capital.  In  short,  if  government  bonds
are  not  net  private  r^realth,  no  accommodatj-on  schene  would
stabilize  output.
5,  Summary
In  this  paper,  I  show  that  the  monetary  authority  can
stabiLize  prices  and  inside  money by  perfectly  accomrnodating
changes  in  reserve  requirements  with  open  market  operations.
Hovtever,  this  accomnodation  scheme  results  in  changes  in  both
capital  and  output.  I  also  show  that  a  partial  acconnodation
scheme  exists  such  that  capital  and  output  remain  constant,  but
price  and  inside  rnoney  fluctuate.  The  ts/o  accornmodation  sehemes,
therefore,  inply  that  the  nonetary  authority  can  stabilize  prices
in  one  accornrnodation  or  output  in  another  stabil-iztion  scherne.
Such  coordinated  monetary  poJ"icy  actions  cannot  simultaneously
satisfy  both  price  and  output  stabilization  goals.
The nain  contribution  of  this  paper  is  to  explicitly  exarnine
7  Analysis  of  the  real  effects  of  seignorage  revenue  on  the
governrnent I  s  debt  burden  can  be  found  in  t"letzler  (1951),  Miller
(1981),  and Chanp and Freeman (1990).
2Lhow  coordinated  monetary  policy  actions  effect  economic  activi-ty.
Both  anecdotal  and  ernpirical  evidence  suggest  that  the  Fed  uses
these  policy  tools  in  conjunction.  Hence,  the  results  in  this
paper  add  to  our  understanding  of  the  effects  of  monetary  policy.
Moreover,  the  results  esLablish  conditions  in  fhich  the  monetary
authority  can  stabilize  prices  or  output.  One niqht  use  this
frarnework  for  anaLyzing  the  Fedts  behavior  in  the  sense  that  the
I'ed  chooses  either  of  the  two  pure  accornmodation  schernes
identified  here  to  stabilize  prices  or  output  (the  pure
stabilization  strategies)  or  chooses  o"  <  c  <  1  (a  mixed
strategy),  reflecting  the  central  bank's  willingness  to  have  both
prices  and  output  fluctuate  instead  of  fluctuation  all  in  one
variable,
Several  extensions  to  this  analysis  are  worth  noting.
First,  the  analysis  here  does  not  address  the  welfare
inplications  assocj,ated  qrith  coordinated  monetary  policy  actions.
Generally,  the  question  remains  whether  an  optirnal  accornrnodation
scheme exist.
second,  what  are  the  ernpirical  irnplications  of  this
analysis?  Clearl-y,  there  are  accommodation  schemes  in  which  both
prices  and  output  are  affected.  Accordingly,  the  Fed nay  be
willing  to  trade-off  more  or  less  price  variability  relative  to
output  variability,  Insofar  as  movements  in  reserve  requirements
reflect  other  monetary  policy  concerns  (conpetitiveness  with
other  regulatory  agencies  prior  to  1980.  for  exarnple),  the
resuLts  presented  here  suggest  that  the  appropriate  accommodationscheme maximizes  a  Barro-cordon  (l-983)  type  Fed  objective
function  v/ith  output  variabj-Iity  and  price  variability  as
argurnents.  In  this  !uay,  one  night  be  able  to  exanine  the
properties  of  the  optinal  accommodatj-on  scheme.  And  derive  more
specific  testalcle  hypotheses.Referenceg
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